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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

UTAH MORTGAGE LOAN CORPORATION,
Plaintiff-Appellant
vs.

CASE NO. 16610

BETTY J. BLACK, individually
and as personal representative
of the estate of DON J. BLACK,
and DON J. BLACK REALTY, INC.,
Defendants-Respondents

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE
ARGUMENT
POINT I
A HOLDING THAT THE ONE-ACTION RULE PRECLUDES AN ACTION FOR
A DEFICIENCY WHEN MORTGAGED PROPERTY IS RELEASED WITH
CONSENT OF THE MORTGAGOR IS NEITHER DESIRABLE NOR REQUIRED
This Court has granted the Utah Bankers Association
leave to file an amicus curiae brief with respect to this
appeal.

The Utah Bankers Association is a nonprofit trade

association composed of all commercial banks located within the
State of Utah.

The object of this brief is to assist the Court

in the application of the one-action rule, consistently with
legislative intent and prior judicial construction, so as to
avoid frustrating reasonable expections of lenders and
borrowers.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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....
Financing arrangements such as the one presented i·
this case are common.
.
A construction. loan is the usual source of fu:
with wh7ch the builder will finance the improvements he
17ill build on the land.
In essence, the construction Jr
is a short-term loan, usually secured by a first mortg~
or deed of trust on the property, which will be paid ofi
full as to each lot when the lot is ultimately sold to;
~ome.buy7r.
Most construction loans are made by
institutional lenders; savings and loan associations
comercial banks, and real estate investment trusts a;e t·
most active participants.
G. Nelson and D. Whitman, Cases and Materials on Real Estate
Finance and Development, 553
A.

(1976).

THE ONE-ACTION RULE PERMITS SALE OF THE
COLLATERAL IN ANY MANNER AGREED UPON BY THE
MORTGAGOR

This Court has articulated two purposes for the
one-action rule:
a.
The statute was created for the very purpoo
of doing away with the rule allowing an action on a note,
and also a suit to foreclose the note securing it, and t
avoid a multiplicity of actions on the same debt.
Mickelson v

Anderson, 81 Utah 444, 19 P.2d 1033, 1036 (1931

b.
It is therefore held that under that statu:
the property mortgaged or pledged, or the proceeds derive
upon a sale in an action in equity to foreclose the
mortgage, constitutes the fund to pay the debt, and it~
be exhausted before a personal judgment can be entered
against the makers of the note.
Smith v

Jarman,

61 Utah 125, 131, 211 P 962 (1922).

Mortgage Foreclosure:
Rev.

2 7 8 ( 19 5 9) .

See Not

The One-Action Rule In Utah, 6 ~

In tr.e case before this Court, there is no

objective of the one-action rule to be served.

The collaterc

has been exhausted by agreement of the parties and there canr
be a multiplicity of actions.

Because the collateral has be'

-2Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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I

sold and the proceeds applied to the debt by agreement of the
parties prior to this suit on the note, this is not a suit on a
debt secured by a mortgage.

Therefore the one-action rule

which applies only to debts "secured solely by a mortge.ge upon
real estate" does not apply.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-37-1 (1953).

Focusing upon the purposes of the one-action rule, the
avoidance of a multiplicity of suits on the same debt and prior
exhaustion of the collateral, assists in the proper application
of the rule.

Certainly, the beneficiary of a trust deed can

cause exhaustion of the collateral pursuant to statute without
fear that the one-action rule will bar a deficiency.
Under the provisions of Sec. 57-1-23, U.C.A.
1953, as amended, it is made optional with the beneficiary
of the trust deed whether to foreclose the trust property
after a breach of an obligation in a manner provided for
foreclosure of mortgages or to have the trustee proceed
under the power of sale provided therein.
Security Title Co., v. Payless Builders Supply, 17 Utah 2d 179,
407 P. 2d 141, 142 (1965).
As with the trust deed sale, all sales of mortgaged
property, with the consent of the mortgagor, whether by
agreement at the time the mortgage is granted or thereafter,
are compatable with the purposes of the one-action rule.
Indeed,

this Court has specifically approved such sales.

The mortgagor and the mortgagee could agree upon
the manner of sale, and, if the property was sold pursuant
to the agreement at a fair price, no one, not even one who
claimed a subsequent lien upon the property, could legally
object.
Utah Ass'n

of Credit Men v

Jones, 164 P. 1029, 1031 (1917) ·
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B.

AN EXPANSION OF THE ONE-ACTION RULE TO PRECLUD'
DEFICIENCIES AFTER A CONSENSUAL SALE OF MOR~~
PROPERTY WOULD SHARPLY CURTAIL AN IMPORTANT F~
OF FINANCING IN UTAH
.

Respondent has urged the lower Court to hold that
because Appellant released the realty pursuant to agreement
between parties, and could not, therefore, foreclose upon thE
realty, it is barred by the one-action rule from collecti~~
balance due on the note.

Such a windfall to the mortgagor is

repugnant to all sense of fairness.

Having released collater:

with the mortgagor's agreement, the lender should not be
punished by being denied an opportunity to recover the balanc'
of its loan.

Moreover, an application of the one-action ru~

to these facts changes the entire character of the relationsh:
between mortgagors and mortgagees.
If this Court adopts the position urged by respondent
below, it appears inevitable that all real property securing
the debt must be available for foreclosure.

Thus, when the

first lot is released, in fact, when an agreement such as

~e

one before the Court is entered into, the lender has committed
itself to look only to the collateral for recovery of its
loan.

Under such circumstances, lenders and borrowers

wouN~

1/
unable to ever agree to the release of collateral- and no
funding would be available in situations when such an agreemen'.
is essential.

!I If all the lots but one had been released, cou~
the lender refuse to release the last one - despite the prior
agreement - merely to comply Wl
. . th
- the letter of § 78-37-1 and
establish a basis for a def 1c1ency judgmPnt?
-4Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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If this be the law, a lender can give little weight to
the financial strength of the borrower.

The financial risks of

a project are shifted from the borrower, who usually is in
control of the project, to the lender whose maximum recovery is
the amount of the loan and interest.

The incentive of the

borrower to make the project a success, and thereby avoid
personal loss, is gone.

Because of the lar.k of predictability

of the cost and marketability of many real estate developments,
the lender is rarely certain of sufficient collateral.

Except

in cases of exceptionally high collateral to loan ratios, no
prudent lender could be expected to accept such risks.

One

important form of financing would be eliminated in Utah.

POINT II
THE ONE-ACTION RULE DOES NOT BAR AN ACTION AGAINST SURETIES
In Point II of its brief, Appellant argues that
Mr. and Mrs. Black are sureties.

If they are sureties, this

Court's previous decisions make it clear that they are not
entitled to the benefit of the one-action rule.

This Court has

stated that the statute is for the protection of the mortgagor
and possibly for "those who have or claim some specific lien
upon the mortgaged property, but the statute was certainly not
to give those whom neither have or claim to have any specific
rights in or to the property the right to object."
of Credit Men v
(1917).

Utah Ass'n

Jones, 49 Utah 519, 164 P. 1029, 1030-31,

"The provisions of that act apply only to actions

-5- provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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between mortgagors and mortgagees."
Processing Plant, 7 Utah 2d 286,

P1· 11 s b ury M
· 11 s v
.1

323 P.2d 266,

268,

N~

(1958).

is important to remember that the concept of one action with
respect to a mortgage is purely statutory.

In stressing thi:

point the Utah Supreme Court has quoted from 41 Am.Jur., Ple:
and Collateral Security, § 99:
The taking of collateral security for the pay 1,
of a debt does not, in the absence of a statute or
stipulation to the contrary, afford any implication that
the creditor is to look to it only or primarily for the
payment of the debt.
The obligation of the debtor to
respond in his person and property is the same as if no
security had been given, and upon default in payment, th'
pledgee may elect to sue the pledgor for his debt, wit~.
a sale of the security, and may recover a judg;nent in su:
suit against the pledgor for the amount of the debt,
without destroying or in the least affecting his lien on
the property pledged.
And he is not required to return:
security before bringing suit on the claim secured, int'
absence of a special contract to that effect, altho~h~
that claim is satisfied he may be compelled to release:
reassign· the collaterals .
Camobell v

Peter, 108 Utah 565, 162 P. 2d 754

(1945).

CONCLUSION
Irrespective of the outcome of this appeal, the u~
curiae respectfully urges this Court to avoid any holding or
dicta which would hamper the ability of lenders and borrower
to enter into agreements for realty financing which would
permit orderly release of collateral, pursuant to agreement,
without risk of loss of the right to recover a deficiency.
is suggested that the Court will achieve a correct result i'.
applies the one-action rule only insofar as is necessary~
achieve its objectives, prevention of a multiplicity of sui:
on the same debt and exhaustion of collateral before defici'
judgment.

-6-
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DATED this 26th day of November, 1979.

FABIAN & CLENDENIN

Byw~·

Peter W. Bill~s

By

!tb-n L Okt.L

Glen E. Clark
Attorneys for
Utah Bankers Association,
Amicus Curiae

\
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

This is to certify that on this

:Z-.6

day of November,

1979, I caused to be mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Brief of Amicus Curiae, postage prepaid, to Richard
B. Ferrari and L.S. McCullough, Jr., Attorneys for
1200 Beneficial Life Tower,

Respond9~

36 South State Street, Salt Lake

City, Utah 84111, and to Steven H. Gunn, Ray, Quinney &
Nebeker, Attorneys for Appellant, Suite 400, Deseret

79 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.
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Buildi~,

(

JAMES A. McINTOSH
McMURRAY, McINTOSH, BUTLER & NIELSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Suite 800 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-5125
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR IRON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MORLEY WILSON and
MARY ELLEN WILSON,

PLAINTIFFS ME..l10RANDUl1 OF _';
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN
SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO
DENY DEFENDANT' S MOTION TO (
DISMISS
I

Plaintiffs,
v.

HUBERT C. LAMBERT,

e

Defendant.

Civil No.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On or about October 16, 1978, the defendant filed for the·
first time his MOTION TO DISMISS the above-entitled matter.

~is

MOTION was filed more than ten (10) years after the instant
action was conunenced; more than seventeen (17) months after
defendant executed its STIPULATION agreeing that Morley

t~

Wilso~r

and Mary Ellen Wilson could be substituted as parties plaintif£s
in the above-entitled lawsuit thereby implying that the plain-.
tiffs could move ahead on the said lawsuit; more than seven

(7~

months after the court's own ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE hearing on M1¥"ch
6, 1978, in which the court directed both parties in this

cas~

to

appear and show cause why the action should not be dismissed :!pr
failure to prosecute at which time the plaintiffs and their
counsel appeared; however neither the defendant nor his couns1l
appeared and at which time the court dismissed its ORDER TO S~OW
CAUSE and set the matter down for trial; more than eight (8)
months after the plaintiffs filed their REQUEST FOR TRIAL SETTING
stating that they were ready to proceed with trial in this matter;
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but only approximately ten (10) days after the plaintiffs filed
their FIRST INTERROGATORIES TO THE DEFENDANT requiring the defendant to answer a substantial series of questions dealing with the
issues in this case.

It appears obvious the defendant wants to

peacefully ignore this case and hope it will die an uneventful
death but the he will refuse to do any work on the case to get it
ready for trial.
Within approximately one (1) week after receiving the defendant's MOTION TO DISMISS, the plaintiffs filed their MOTION TO
DENY DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS and also filed their NOTICE OF
MOTIONS setting this matter for an immediate hearing before the
Honorable J. Harlan Burns on Wednesday, the 8th day of November,
1978, conunencing at 3:00 p.m.

Counsel for the defendant was not

able to appear on that day and requested a continuance which was
granted setting the matter for the present time on Tuesday,
December 5, 1978, coIImlencing at 3:00 p.m.
After the plaintiffs filed their MOTION TO DENY DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS and their NOTICE OF MOTIONS and within four (4)
days thereafter, the defendant filed its MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF
TIME TO ANSWER INTERROGATORIES requesting the court to extend the
normal thirty (30) day period for the defendant to answer the
INTERROGATORIES until thirty (30) days "from and after the entry
of the final ORDER denying such dismissal," referring to the
ORDER which the court might enter denying the defendant's MOTION
TO DISMISS.
The PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO DENY DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
set out ten (10) grounds upon which the plaintiffs would rely in
arguing this matter to the above-entitled court.

On November 29,

1978, the defendant responded to the ten (10) points in that
certain document entitled DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION TO DENY DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS.
The instant MEMORANDUM will set forth the plaintiffs' points
and authorities upon which it is relying in support of its MOTION
TO DENY DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS.
-2Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The COMPLAINT in the above-entitled matter was filed on
March 11, 1968, in the above-entitled court by J. Lambert Gibson,
Attorney for the plaintiff Jeff Baldwin.

The State Engineer

filed his ANS\JER on April 22, 1978, and mailed a copy of same to
the plaintiff's attorney, J. Lambert Gibson at Gibson's Salt Lake
City office address.
Nothing further was done on the matter until on April 26,

1973, when the above-entitled court through District Judge J.
Harlan Burns entered an ORDER SETTING TRIALS setting the aboveenti tled case for trial on Monday, September 17, 1973.

Again,

notice of the said ORDER SETTING TRIALS was mailed to J. Lambert
Gibson at his Salt Lake City office address, 174 East 800 South.
For some reason unknown to either the present plaintiffs in this
action or their counsel the said trial was not had at the time
set.
EXHIBIT 1 attached to this MEMORANDUM is a copy of an
AFFIDAVIT executed by Dean W. Sheffield, Executive Director of
the Utah State Bar, on October 30, 1978.

In this AFFIDAVIT, Mr.

Sheffield states in part as follows:
2. J. Lambert Gibson was a member of the Utah
State Bar having been admitted to the Bar January 5,
1937. He was suspended from the Bar June 13, 1967,
for non-payment of license fees and was re-instated
April 26, 1968. Mr. Gibson was again suspended May 14,
1971, for non-payment of license fees and was not
thereafter re-instated.
It thus appears that when the COMPLAINT was filed in the
above-entitled matter on March 11, 1968, Mr. Gibson was not an
active member of the Utah State Bar and was not authorized to
practice law.

He never made this fact known to the court appar-

ently, and was reinstated about six (6) weeks later on April 26,

lq68.

However, his license to practice law was again suspended

on May 14, 1971, and from that time through the present date, he
was not authorized to practice law.

Apparently, none of this

inforn1ettion wRs communicated either to his client, Jeff Baldwin,
or to the above-entitled court since nothing appears in the
official records on file in the Office of the Iron County Clerk.
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furthermore, since the Clerk's Office has continued to send all
mailings to J. Lambert Gibson as attorney for the plaintiff at
his Salt Lake City law offices, it appears he never d"d
i
notify
the court of either the fact that he was suspended from the
practice of law or that the plaintiff, Jeff Baldwin, should
retain new counsel.

It is obvious from a casual inspection of

the court records that no NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL was
ever filed by Mr. Gibson.

Under these circumstances, the plain-

tiff, Jeff Baldwin, was placed under a serious handicap and the
status of Mr. Gibson's license to practice law is no doubt one of
the main reaons why this case was not moved forward for so many
years.
The original plaintiff, Jeff Baldwin, died on November 8,
1975, in Beaver County, State of Utah.

[See paragraph 1 of the

MOTION TO SUBSTITUTE PARTY PLAINTIFF filed in this court on or
about May, 1977.]

Thereafter, one, John Davis, was appointed the

Administrator of the Estate of Jeff Baldwin, Deceased.

[See

EXHIBIT 1 attached to the said I10TION TO SUBSTITUTE PARTY PLAINTIFF in the official records herein.]

Subsequent to the said

appointment and on or about August 6, 1976, certain real property formerly owned by the said Jeff Baldwin was sold by the
Administrator to Morley Wilson and Mary Ellen Wilson, his wife,
the present plaintiffs in this matter; that the said property
included among other things the four (4) Water Applications Nos.
24624, 24625, 24626, and 24627, which were filed in the Office of
the Utah State Engineer and which are the subject matter of this
instant lawsuit.

A copy of the CONTRACT OF SALE which was exe-

cuted between the Wilsons and John Davis as Administrator of the
Estate of Jeff Baldwin is attached to this MEMORANDUM as EXHIBIT
2 and is by reference incorporated herein and made a part hereof
at this time.
In the said EXHIBIT 2, the Wilsons agreed to pay a substantial amount of money, to-wit:

fifty-six thousand five hundred

dollars ($56,500.00) for the real property and water rights which
-4Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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are described in the said EXHIBIT.

This is a substantial change

in the plaintiffs-Wilsons' position and was made based on their
interpretation of Jeff Baldwin's rights in the instant lawsuit.
Since the water rights add substantially to the value of the nine
hundred and sixty (960) acres of real property purchased, and
since the purchase price would be far less than fifty-six thousand five hundred dollars ($56,500.00) if the water rights did
not exist, it is clear the Wilsons were only willing to pay the
fifty-six thousand five hundred dollar ($56,500.00) purchase
price if the water rights could be included.

It was based on

this assumption and the further assignment of the water rights by
the Administrator, that the land CONTRACT (EXHIBIT 2 attached
hereto) was executed by the Wilsons.

Had the Wilsons had any

intimation that the instant lawsuit involving the water rights
was defective in any way or subject to a statutory MOTION TO
DISMISS, they would never have executed the CONTRACT.
Although the CONTRACT OF SALE attached hereto as EXHIBIT 2
is dated August 6, 1976, the authority to execute the said CONTRACT was not given by the probate court for Beaver County until
May 16, 1977, and a former CONTRACT OF SALE executed by Helen
Lorraine Baldwin was superceded by the new one executed by John
Davis, Administator.

[See paragraph 4 of the MOTION TO SUBSTI-

TUTE PARTY PLAINTIFF on file herein.]

Immediately after the said

CONTRACT OF SALE was approved by the probate court for Beaver
County on May 16, 1977, and the next day on May 17, 1977, the
rlaintiffs, Morley Wilson and Mary Ellen Wilson, his wife, served
tLeir MOTION TO SUBSTITUTE PARTY PLAINTIFFS in the above-entitled
matter.

On May 17, 1977, the defendant through his attorney,

Dallin W. Jensen, executed a STIPULATION authorizing the substitution of party plaintiffs and an ORDER was executed on May 19,
1977, by Judge J. Harlan Burns permitting the substitution.
These documents dealing with substitution of parties plaintiffs were prepared by James A. Mcintosh, new counsel of record
for the Wilsons.

Mr. Mcintosh was first contacted by Mr. Wilson
-5-
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on March 17, 1977, and the following two (2) months were spent
getting matters in the probate estate straightened.

From May,

1977, for the remainder of the year, Mr. Mcintosh spent a substantial amount of time in conferences with his client, conferences
with representatives from the State Engineer's Office, and in
meetings with representatives from the United States Geological
Survey Office.

Other work was done in an effort to prepare this

case for trial, and on or about February 13, 1978, the said
Mcintosh filed on behalf of his clients a REQUEST FOR TRIAL
SETTING asking the court to refer this matter for an immediate
trial.
An ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE hearing was held on March 6, 1978,
pursuant to the court's own ORDER directly the parties to appear
in the above-entitled court to show cause, if any, why the case
should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute the action
further.

The plaintiffs and their connsel, James A. Mcintosh,

were present at the time of the hearing; however neither the
defendant nor his counsel appeared.

Mr. Mcintosh explained to

Judge J. Harlan Burns the sequence of activities that had occurred
since he had been retained to represent the Wilson; and, after
hearing these matters, the court dismissed its ORDER TO SHOW
CAUSE and referred the matter to the trial calendar.
Nothing further was done of this matter, and it was not set
for the trial calendar for the following seven (7) months.
Therefore, on or about October 3, 1978, the plaintiffs filed
their FIRST INTERROGATORIES TO THE DEFENDANT dealing with substan~ial

inquiries as to the issues raised in the pleadings on file

herein.

Faced with these INTERROGATORIES and the necessity of

answering the same, the defendant in less than one (1) week after
receiving the INTERROGATORIES filed for the first time his MOTION
TO DISMISS.
The defendant's MOTION TO DISMISS is based on § 73-3-15, Utah
Code Annotated, and is further based upon the Utah Supreme Court
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case of Dansie v. Lambert, 542 P.2d 742 (Utah 1975), which the
defendant says is authority for his MOTION TO DISMISS.
Immediately upon receipt of the said MOTION TO DISMISS, the
plaintiffs filed their MOTION TO DENY DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
DISMISS and set forth ten (10) grounds as a basis for the said
denial.

This instant MEMORANDUM will discuss those ten (10)

points.
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I.

SECTION 73-3-15, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT VIOLATES ARTICLE V, SECTION 1 OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION DEALING WITH THE SEPARATION OF POWERS PRINCIPLE IN
THAT IT IS A LEGISLATIVE ATTEMPT TO INTERFERE WITH A JUDICIAL
FUNCTION.

Section 73-3-15, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, reads in part as
follows:
An action to review a decision of the State Engineer m~y be dismissed upon the application of any of
the parties upon the grotmds provided in Rule 41 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for the dismissal of
actions generally and for failure to prosecute such
action with diligence. For the purpose of this section, failure to prosecute a suit to final judgment
within two (2) years after it is filed, or, if an
appeal is taken to the Supreme Court within three (3)
years after the filing of the suit, shall constitute
lack of diligence.
The defendant argues this section is mandatory and allows
the court no discretion whatsoever even though Rule 41 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is clearly discretionary with the
trial judge.

Section 73-3-15 is an attempt by the legislature to

tell the court that cases must be brought to final judgment
within two (2) years after a complaint is filed or to a final
appeal within three (3) years after the filing of the complaint.
This section was fatally defective even when passed in 1937; but
is even more so forty-one (41) years later when the courts calendars have become so congested and where it may be impossible for
the matter to reach fruition at the trial level or for a final
appeal decision to be made even though the plaintiffs are moving
it ahead with dispatch.

Section 73-3-15 does not require the

trial judge to give water law appeals any priority on the calendar; and therefore there would be nothing in the documents filed
in the County Clerk's Office that would alert the clerk to give
water law appeRls any priority.

The section further makes no

allowance for the contingencies of a sole trial judge in the
area dying, the attorneys dying, the attorneys getting disbarred
or suspended from the practice of law and not notifying their
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clients or the courts as exists in the present case.

The section

does not require the defendant to make a motion
·
to dismiss at any
particular time and therefore the defendant could theoretically
wait until ten (10) days before the trial after the plaintiffs
have incurred substantial attorney's fees and other court costs
in preparing for the case and then make the motion to dismiss.
Finally, the congested court calendars and other inevitable
delays in bringing a case to trial, especially in large counties
like Salt Lake Colll1ty, would effectively close the courtroom
doors to any relief for the plaintiffs; even though they had done
everything they could to try to satisfy the provisions of the
statute.
The courts have lll1iforrnly held that such statutes are lll1constitutional and void as being an attempt by the legislative
branch of the governement to usurp the powers conferred upon the
judicial branch of the government by the Constitution and to
limit or abolish the judicial discretion belonging to the courts
and necessary for the proper administration of justice.
In Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Long, et al., 251 P. 486
(Okla. 1926), the court was asked to construe a section of an
initiative measure adopted by a vote of the people under the
initiative and referendum laws of the State of Oklahoma providing
that the district courts shall try certain classes of cases
within ten (10) days after the defendant has answered, and that
appeals must be taken within ten (10) days from the rendition of
juclg1.1ent except for good cause shown the trial court may extend
t'.1is time for a period of not to exceed twenty (20) days, and the
Supreme Court shall determine the appeal at the earliest possible
moment.

The court held that not only the particular section

being construed but the entire statute itself was invalid, uncons ituti onal, and void.

The court recognized the sole question

presented by the appeal was whether the act, and particularly §3
thereof, was in conflict with the provisions of the Oklahoma
Constitution dealing with separation of powers.

These provisions
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were found in Article IV, Section 1 of the Constitution of Oklahoma and are similar to the provisions found in Article IV,
Section 1, of the Utah Constitution.

The court noted the law was

well settled that the powers and functions of the three (3)
several co-ordinant branches of the state government must be and
forever remain separate and distinct, each one designed for a
separate purpose and each functioning in its own sphere, and that
the separation of powers doctrine was the basic principle of the
constitutional system.
After citing §3 of the Act, the court stated in part as
follows:
Then, the question here is, can the courts be
stripped of their discretionary powers guaranteed to
them under the Constitution, by the legislative branch
of the Government, which, in this instance, is a vote
of the people instead of an enactment of the legislature. No one will deny that the legislative arm of
the Government has the power to alter and regulate the
procedure in both law and equity matters, but for it to
compel the courts to give a hearing to a particular
litigant at a particular time, to the absolute exclusion of others who may have an egual claim upon its
attention, strikes a blow at the very foundation of
constitutional government. The right to control its
order of business and to so conduct the same that the
rights of all litigants may properly be safeguarded has
always been recognized as inherent in courts. And to
strip them of that authority would necessarily render
them so impotent and ~seless as to leave little excuse
for their existence and place in the hands of the
legislative branch of the State power and control never
contemplated by the Constitution.
It takes no great exercise of the imagination to
contemplate a condition arising wherein it would be
impossible for the district court to try a particular
case within ten (10) days after defendant had filed his
answer, and that one or the other of the litigants
would be entitled to a continuance, but under the
provisions of this act, however meritorious an application for continuance might be, it must be denied, and
it is violative of the priciples of constitutional
government and repugnant to every sense of justice to
say that the court shall require one litigant to go to
trial within a specified time under the provisions of
this act where under the exact circumstances it would
be a reversible error to require another litigant to go
to trial, and yet this is the practical effect of the
provision of the act before us.
[emphasis added]
The Oklahoma Supreme Court noted decisions from other jurisdictions recognizing the absurd result created if the statute was
upheld; and it accordingly held the act was unconstitutional,
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invalid, and void, it being an attempt by the legislative branch
of the government to usurp the power conferred upon the judicial
branch of the government by the Constitution and to limit or
abolish the judicial discretion belonging to the

t
cour s necessary

for the proper administration of justice.
Rule 4l(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure gives a
trial judge discretionary power to dismiss an action for failure
to prosecute.

Section 73-3-15, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, is an

attempt by the legislature to interfere with the judicial discretion granted by Rule 5l(b).

Under these circumstances it is

obvious the statutory provision must fail because it is an attempt
by the legislature to interfere with a judicial function, to-wit:
that of the court docket and the quantity of businss submitted to
the court, the nature, the importance, and the difficulties
attending the just and legal solution of matters involved.
In resolving an identical conflict between a statute similar
to §73-3-15 and a rule of civil procedure similar to §4l(b), the
~

j

Hevada Supreme Court has held that the statute is void, invalid,

~

~

and unconstitutional because it violates the separation of powers
doctrine.

Lindauer v. Allen, 456 P.2d 851 (Nev. 1969).

In

discussing the priority between the judicial rules of civil
procedure and statutes attempting to interfere with those rules,
the Nevada Supreme Court stated:
The legislature may, by statute, sanction the
exercise of inherent powers by the courts, and the
courts may acquiesce in such pronouncements b~ ~he
legislature, but when a statute attempts to limit or
destroy an inherent power of the courts, that statute
must fail.
Article 3, Section l, of the Nevada Constitution
which provides for the division ~f the powers.of government prohibits persons charged with the exercise of
powers properly belonging to one of the three (3)
separate departments from exercising any funct~ons .
appertaining to either of the other~. A~y ~egi~lation
undertakin to re uire "udicial action within fixed
erio s o time is an unconstitutional inter erence b
the legislature with a judicial unction: Whether o~
not justice is administered without 1 denial or delay
is a matter for which the judges are answerab~e to th~
people and not to the General Assembly of Ohio. Manifestly: when a case can be heard and determined by a
court must necessarily depend very largely upon the
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court docket, and the quantity of business submitted to
the court, the nature, the importance, and the difficulties attending the just and legal solution of matters
involved.
[emphasis added]
The court then held the rules of civil procedure did apply and the
statute conflicting with those rules was unconstitutional and
void.

Similarly, in the instant case, §73-3-15 is clearly an

attempt to interfere with the court's docket and the quantity of
business submitted to the court, the nature, the importance, and
the difficulties attending the just and legal solution of matters
involved.
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II.

SECTION 73-3-15, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VOID BECAUSE IT VIOLATES THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND
OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 7 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION IN THAT IT
CREATES AN ARBITRARY CLASSIFICATION OF PERSONS MAKING APPEALS
BEFORE AND AFTER THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE ACT AND THE CLASSIFICATION HAS NO REASONABLE RELATIONSHIP TO THE PURPOSES OF THE ACT.

Section 73-3-15, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides in part
as follows:
An action to review a decision of the State Engineer may be dismissed upon the application of any of
the parties upon the grounds provided in Rule Lfl of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for the dismissal of
actions generally and for failure to prosecute such
action with diligence. For the purpose of this section, failure to prosecute a suit to final judgment
within two (2) years after it is filed or, if an appeal
is taken to the Supreme Court within three (3) years
after the filing of the suit, shall constitute lack of
diligence. All suits heretofore or hereafter commenced
must be dismissed after ten (10) days' notice by regular mail to the plaintiff, unless such suits are or
were prosecuted to final judgment within the time
specified above; provided, as to suits filed before the
enactment hereof the court may upon a proper showing
extend the time for a rosecution to final "ud ent for
a eriod of not to exceed two 2
ears from the date
of hearin o an motion to dismiss iled ursuant to
this section.
emphasis added

The underlined part of the quoted portion of §73-3-15 is
fatal to the section because it creates an arbitrary classification which substantially benefits those who file their lawsuits
before the enactment of the act but does not allow this same
benefit to those who file their lawsuits after the enactment of
the act such as the plaintiffs in the instant case.
~rpears

to-wit:

Hence, it

the classification is based entirely upon a time element,
whether the party has filed the complaint before the

'"nactment of the act or after the that time.
The obvious and unconsciousable result of the underlined
provision is to allow a person who filed his appeal lawsuit in
the oistrict court one (1) day before the act was passed to be
able to sit on it for fifty (50) years before the motion to
dismiss is made by the State Engineer; and then to receive a bene-13Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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fit of a further two (2) year extension; whereas a person who
files one (1) day after the act is passed and who has not been
able to bring the case to trial through no fault of his own is
penalized by having the action dismissed upon the filing of the
"motion to dismiss" without any further two (2) year extension
being awarded.

Similar arbitrary classifications based on time

elements have been struck down in the overwhelming majority of
the cases deciding this issue.
The Utah Supreme Court has determined that a denial of the
equal protection of the laws occurs where there is a discrimination between those who are included and those who are excluded
from the operation of a statute on the basis of an arbitrary
classification.

State v. Mason, 94 Utah 501, 78 P.2d 920 (1938).

In Hasan, the court held that a classification is reasonable
where the differentiation bears a reasonable relation to the
purposes to be accomplished by the act.

The purpose to be accom-

plished by §73-3-15, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, as
stated in the case of Dansie v. Lambert, supra, is "designed to
put a time barrier against litigation, in determining the precious water rights in this arid state."

If this is the purpose

and basis of the statutory provision, then it would apply equally
to those who file before the statute was enacted in 1937 as well
as to those who file their lawsuits after the statement was
enacted.

Why shouldn't the plaintiffs be entitled to have the

court extend the time for an additional two (2) years or less
after the MOTION TO DISMISS is heard--the same right preserved to
those filing before the effective date of the act?
The legislature attempts to leave it up to the arbitrary
whims of the Attorney General in filing his motion to dismiss and
then goes on to extend the time an additional two (2) years after
the mot"ic'n to dismiss is filed for those persons who commenced
their LH,·suit prior to the effective date of the act.

If the

Attorney General waited twenty (20) years to bring the motion to
dismiss, the claimant would receive an additional benefit of two
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(2) years if he had commenced his lawsuit prior to the effective
date of the act; and this result clearly would not further the
purposes of the act to put a "time barrier against litigation in
determining the precious water rights in this arid state."

Under

these circumstances, the persons who file their lawsuits after
the effective date of the act are discriminated against and those
who have filed lawsuits prior to the effective date of the act
are favored.

Clearly, such a classification based solely on time

element has no relationship whatsoever to the purposes sought to
be accomplished by the water act, and it is therefore a denial
of the plaintiffs' equal protection of the law.
In New Mexico, the legislature attempted to pass a certain
statute (Laws 1921, Chapter 185) which provided that all private
corporations organized under the laws of the Territory of New
Mexico which failed to file an annual report would be automatically dissolved.

The New Mexico Supreme Court was called upon to

construe this statute and determine if there was an arbitrary
classification which denied certain corporations their equal
protection of the law in that the act made the time of incorporation rather than the failure to file the reports the decisive
factor in determining delinquency.
145 P.2d 219 (N.M. 1944).

State v. Sunset Ditch Co.,

The court held the statute was uncon-

stitutional and void because it created a legislative classification based entirely upon a time element when the time selected
had no reasonable relation to the object of the legislation.
court noted the act
Did not apply to all existin~ corporation which.were
delinquent in respect to making reports, etc.; it
applied only to 'private corporations or7anized :inde7
the laws of the Territory of Hew Mexico.
Thus it will
be seen that the act makes the time of incorporation
rather than the mere failure to file reports, the
decisive factor in determining delinquency as it effects
a dissolution of the corporation and forfeiture of its
charter. We see no reasonable basis for the distinction . . . . Many corporations, whether organized before
or after January 6, 1912, the date of statehood, are
the same type of corporation, are formed_unde7 the same
laws, possessed like powers and present ident~cal
problems of supervision and control.
[emphasis added]
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The

Similarly, in the instant case, the time element is also
present in §73-3-15.

The underlined portion quoted at the begin-

ning of this argument creates an arbitrary classification penalizing those seeking review of the Engineer's rulings in that those
plaintiffs that filed their lawsuit before the enactment of the
statute may, by continual extension and delay and an additional
two (2) year benefit prolong litigation indefinitely, while those
who filed after the enactment of the statute have no such privilege.

Yet plaintiffs in both cases bring the same type of suit,

under the same statute, presenting "identical problems of supervision and control."

Clearly, the section is tmconstitutional

and creates an arbitrary classification which bears no reasonable
relation to the purposes to be accomplished by the act and therefore is an unconstitutional denial of equal protection of the
laws guaranteed both by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and by Article I, Section 7 of the Utah
Constitution.

-16Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

III.

SECTION 73-3-15 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VOID BECAUSE IT
VIOLATES ARTICLE I, SECTION 11 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION IN THAT
ITS APPLICATION TO THE INSTANT CASE CLOSES THE COURTROOM DOORS TO
THE PLAINTIFFS.

Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution provides as
follows:
All courts shall be open, and every person for an
injury done to him and his person, property, or' reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law which
shall be administered without denial or tmnecessary
delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting
or defending before any tribtmal in this state, by
himself or cotmsel, any civil cause to which he is a
party.
This section of the Constitution clearly provides that
courtroom doors shall be open to a litigant who has received
injury to himself, property, or reputation and that he shall be
able to pursue his property remedy in the courts of law without
denial.

Section 73-3-15, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, does in fact

deny the plaintiffs the opporttmity to prosecute their action in
court and thus is an unconstitutional interference with Article
I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution.

As pointed out above,

the plaintiffs may with all dispatch attempt to move their case
along; however because of circumstances over which they have no
control whatsoever, it might be impossible for them to comply
with the provisions of the statute which require them to bring
their case to trial judgment in two (2) years or a final appeal
decision within three (3) years.
I11is harsh result arises even though §73-3-15 does not require the courts to give priority to water rights appeals, and
does not require the State Engineer to bring the motion to dismiss within a reasonable time after the two (2) year period.
Furthermore, the circumstances with respect to the congestion of
court calendars and the matter of business had before the courts,
the matters of litigants, attorneys, or judges dying, the matter
of the time it takes a court reporter to get the transcript
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prepared and filed especially under busy deadlines in the larger
counties where numerous appeal are had; the problems of attorneys
being disbarred or suspended from the practice of law and not
letting their clients or the courts know it as in the present
case, etc., etc., all argue against allowing validity to the
Limitation Provisions §73-3-15.
In Oklahoma City v. Castleberry, 413 P.2d 556 (Okla. 1966),
the Supreme Court of Oklahoma was called upon to construe the
policy of Article II, Section 6 of the Constitution of Oklahoma
which is similar to Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution.

In vacating a default judgment against a landowner who had

failed to appear at a condemnation proceeding where the action of
an officer of the court misled him as to the time his cause would
be tried, the Oklahoma Supreme Court stated as follows:
It is the policy of the law to afford every party
to an action a fair opportunity to present his side of
the case, and while it is true the courts must require
diligence on the part of litigants in being present
when cases in which they are interested are being
proceeded with, nevertheless if the court or an officer
of the court by their conduct mislead parties as to the
time cases will be acted upon, the absense of such
parties will be excused.
Similarly, in the present case, the conduct of the court in
denying its own MOTION and ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE dated January 10,
1978, and referring this matter to the trial calendar and the
defendant's approval of this action has induced the plaintiff to
believe his action was being rightfully continued.

Having relied

thereon and proceeded with the litigation of the action by filing
a REQUEST FOR TRIAL SETTING and by filing INTERROGATORIES, the
plaintiff should not be "barred from prosecuting . . . the civil
,:aHse to which he [has become] a party."
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IV.

THE DEFENDANT HAS WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO ASSERT §73-3-15 UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, BECAUSE OF HIS CONDUCT INDUCING THE PLAINTIFFS TO BEL~EVE HE WOULD RAISE IT; BECAUSE OF THE SUSPENSION OF
JEFF BALDWIN S ATTORNEY FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAH; AND BECAUSE OF
THE FAILURE OF THE DEFENDANT TO APPEAR AT THE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
HEARING IN MARCH, 1978.

The Utah Supreme Court has held §73-3-15 is "in substance
and and effect . . . nothing more nor less than a Limitations
Statute, . .

Dansie v. Lambert, 542 P. 2d 742 (Utah 1975).

Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure recognizes a
Statute of Limitations as an affirmative defense.

The Utah

Supreme Court has ruled that a Statute of Limitations as an
affirmative defense must be pleaded pursuant to this provision
of the Rules.

In Re: Jones' Estate (Jones v. State Tax Commis-

sion), 99 Utah 373, 104 P.2d 210 (1940).
In Utah Delaware Minn. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 76
Utah 187, 289 P. 94 (1930), the Utah Supreme Court again held
that a Statute of Limitations defense is waived by the failure to
plead it at the first opportunity.

In this case, the mining

company had been given notice of a claim made by one of its
employees and also had been given notice of the hearing before
the Industrial Commission.
appear.

However, the mining company failed to

A rehearing was granted, and the mining company appeared;

and for the first time interposed the Statute of Limitations
defense.

Refusing to allow the defense, the court stated:

The general rule is that a party can re~y on the
Statute of Limitations only where he pleads it an~
ordinarily is requried to interpose the plea at his
first opportunity.
In the instant case the defendant knew the Utah Supreme
Court had held §73-3-15 to be a Limitations Statute.

In fact,

counsel for the defendant in the instant case, Dallin W. Jensen,
was the same counsel who represented the defendant, State Engineer, in the Dansie case, supra.

Yet, Mr. Jensen not only

failed to raise the Limitations defense when the Dansie case was
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decided on November 10, 1975, but rather went ahead in May of
1977 and executed a STIPULATION allowing the instant lawsuit to
move ahead by the subsitution of parties plaintiffs.
The defendant could have raised the Statute of Limitations
at any time subsequent to two (2) years after the COMPLAINT was
filed in this matter on March 11, 1978.

His failure to do so for

such a long period of time has substantially prejudiced the
present plaintiffs who had executed contracts calling for them to
pay more than fifty-six thousand five hundred dollars ($56,500.00)
for certain real property being purchased in connection with the
water rights which are the subject matter of this lawsuit.

Under

these circumstances, the defendant has not only waived his right
to raise the Statute of Limitations, but should be estopped to do
so for the reasons more fully set forth hereafter.
The defendant has further waived his right to assert §73-315 because he has approved a STIPULATION substituting parties
plaintiffs and has failed to appear at the court's own ORDER TO
SHOW CAUSE hearing dealing with a possible dismissal under Rule
41 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Under these circum-

stances the courts have uniformly held that statutory provisions
similar to §73-3-15 making a dismissal of an action mandatory
after a certain time can be waived by the conduct of the parties.
Bayle-Lacoste and Co., Inc. v. Superior Court of Alameda County,
116 P.2d 458 (Cal.App. 1941); W. T. Rawleigh Co. v. Spencer,
ll8 P.2d 674 (Ariz. 1941); Burke v. Minnesota Elevator Co., 186
NW. 948 (N.D. 1922).
In Bayle-Lacoste, supra, the court construed §583 of the
'~alifornia

Code of Civil Procedure which made it mandatory that

an action should be dismissed as to parties served, if not brought

to trial within five (5) years after the filing thereof, except
where the parties have stipulated in writing that the time may be
extend0cl.

The court construed the statute to be

tlot to rigid that under certain circumstances, notwithstanding defendant's failure to.appear before the
expiration of the five (5) year period, a party as
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plaintiff, cro~s-compl~inant, or intervenor may not
have the benefi~ of a waiver" by his op onent. A
party who, not~ithstanding the absence ol service of
summons upo~ him, makes a general appearance, filing,
after the.five. (5) year period, an answer in which he
seeks affirmative r7lief in damages, as in the present
cas7, thus volun~ari~y becoming a party to the litigation, thereby impliedly waives objection to the
jurisdiction of the court and to the right of dismissal
bas7d upon the record date of the "commencement" of the
action . . . : The purpose of the statute is plain: to
prevent.avoidabl7 del~y for too long of period. It is
not de~ign7d arbitrarily to close the proceeding a:ta'fl
event in five ~5) y7ars, for it permits the parties to
ext7nd the period without limitation, by written stipulation: and. as we have already pointed out despite
the mandatory language. implied exceptions are recognized.
[emphasis added]
In Bayle-Lacoste, the defendant had filed its amended answer
after the five (5) year period and thereafter sought to take
advantage of the statute by moving for a dismissal under §583 of
the California Code.

The court held the defendant had acquiesced

in the delay when it filed its amended answer; and therefore it
had "waived" the mandatory provisions of the statute even though
there was not a written stipulation.
Similarly, in the instant case, where the defendant has
executed a written STIPULATION agreeing that the present plaintiffs could be substituted as parties plaintiffs, and where the
defendant has failed to appear at the court's own to ORDER TO
SHOW CAUSE hearing in March of 1978, and has made no objection to
the court's dismissal of the said hearing and the setting of this
matter for trial, the defendant has certainly "waived" the provisions of §73-3-15, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.

The defendant had

every opportunity to join in the court's MOTION TO DISMISS FOR
FAILURE TO PROSECUTE, yet the defendant failed to do so.
In addition to the conduct of the defendant which clearly
consitutes a "waiver" of his right to assert the provisions of
§73-3-15, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, the action of the trial
court in approving the continuation of this case and referring it
to the trial calendar without objection by the defendant also
argues Llgainst granting the defendant's MOTION TO DISMISS.

In

Cervi v. Town of Greenwood Village, 362 P.2d 150 (Colo. 1961),
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the court postponed and vacated the trial over a period of eight
(8) years at the multiple requests and failures of both parties.
In denying the DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS, the court held that
although it had the inherent power to dismiss a cause for want of
prosecution, such power is not unlimited, and should not be
exercised where the record shows as here, that both parties
nursed the case along with the court's approval.

In the present

case, the trial judge dismissed its own MOTION and referred the
matter to a trial calendar thereby allowing the parties to continue the action.

In reliance thereon, the plaintiff submitted

INTERROGATORIES to the defendant.
Finally, a MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE under

§73-3-15 should not be granted where the attorney for the plaintiffs' predecessor was delinquent, was suspended from the practice of law, and never did notify either the court or his client
of this fact; and where the present plaintiffs have engaged new
counsel who have been diligent in moving the case ahead.
EXHIBIT 1 attached to this MEMORANDUM is an AFFIDAVIT from
Dean W. Sheffield, Executive Director of the Utah State Bar.

In

this AFFIDAVIT, Mr. Sheffield states as follows:
J. Lambert Gibson was a member of the Utah State
Bar having been admitted to the Bar January 5, 1937.
He was suspended from the Bar June 13, 1967, for nonpayment of license fees and was re-instated April 26,
1968. Mr. Gibson was again suspended May 14, 1971, for
non-payment of license fees and was not thereafter
reinstated.
It thus appears that when the COMPLAINT was filed in the
above-entitled matter on March 11, 1968, Mr. Gibson was not an
active member of the Utah State Bar and was not authorized to
1•ractice law.

He never made this fact known to the court appar-

ently, and was reinstated about six (6) weeks later on April 26,

1968.

However, his license to practice law was again suspended

on May lLf, 1971, and from that time through the present date, he
was not authorized to practice law.

Apparently, none of this

inforT'.lation was communicated either to his client, Jeff Baldwin,
or to the above-entitled court since nothing appears in the
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official records on file in the Office of the Iron County Clerk.
Furthermore, since the Clerk's Office has continued to send all
mailings to J. Lambert Gibson as attorney for the plaintiff at
his Salt Lake City law offices, it appears he never did notify
the court of either the fact that he was suspended from the
practice of law or that the plaintiff, Jeff Baldwin, should
retain new counsel.

It is obvious from a casual inspection of

the court records that no NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL was
ever filed by Mr. Gibson.

Under these circumstances, the plain-

tiff, Jeff Baldwin, was placed under a serious handicap and the
status of Mr. Gibson's license to practice law is no doubt one of
the main reaons why this case was not moved forward for so many
years.
In Mizer v. Jones, 403 P.2d 767 (Colo. 1965), the court
denied the defendant's MOTION TO DISMISS because it found that
there were mitigating circumstances for the delay consisting of
the plaintiff's first attorney having dragged his feet for nearly
two (2) years and of the plaintiff's monetary inability to acquire counsel for a year after that.

The court held as follows:

Up to the time of the withdrawal of their first
attorney, the plaintiffs themselves were diligent in
their efforts to have this lawsuit tried. . . . By the
time the motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution was
heard the plaintiffs were ready and anxious to proceed
and were not trying to delay the cause . . . . In the
final analysis, courts have the responsibility t~ do
justice between disputing parties and one's day in
court should not be denied except upon a serious showing of willful default. Such is not the case here.
[emphasis added]
Similarly, in the instant case, the plaintiffs are ready,
willing, and able to try the case at the present time and have
been since they engaged new counsel in 1977.

Under these cir-

cumstances, the trial court should not deny the plaintiffs their
day in court.
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v.

THE DEFENDANT IS ESTOPPED TO ASSERT THE PROVISIONS OF §73-315, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, BECAUSE OF THE DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT
WHICH INDUCED THE PLAINTIFFS TO REASONABLY ASSUME THE INSTANT
LAWSUIT WOULD NOT BE DISMISSED FOR LACK OF PROSECUTION AND BECAUSE
THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE SUBSTANTIALLY CHANGED THEIR POSITION BY
INVESTING OVER FIFTY-SIX THOUSAND DOLLARS ($56,000.00) IN CERTAIN
REAL PROPERTY AND WATER RIGHTS, WHICH ARE THE SUBJECT OF THE
INSTANT LAWSUIT.

By executing the STIPULATION agreeing that Morley Wilson and
Mary Ellen Wilson, his wife, could be substituted as parties
plaintiffs in the above-entitled lawsuit on May 17, 1977, some
nine (9) years after the instant action was commenced, the defendant agreed that the present litigation could be continued and
would not be suject to a MOTION TO DISMISS.

Furthermore, when

the defendant failed to join in the court's own ORDER TO SHOW
CAUSE in January, 1978, requiring both parties to appear and show
cause why the case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute and when the defendant failed to appear at the said ORDER TO
SHOW CAUSE hearing and allowed the court to refer the matter to
the trial calendar, it is clear that the defendant was not going
to assert the dismissal provisions of §73-3-15, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.

Based on this conduct by the defendant, the plain-

tiffs have incurred an indebtedness of over fifty-six thousand
dollars ($56,000.00) for the purchase of certain real property
and water rights which are connected thereto; which water rights
include those in the instant case.

The plaintiffs have also

incurred substantial legal expenses and court costs and other
expenses which they obviously would not have done had they felt
the defendant would raise the provisions of §73-3-15.
In Woley v. Turkus, the trial court had granted a MOTION TO
DISMISS a plaintiff's COMPLAINT pursuant to the provisions of
§583 of the California Code of Civil Procedure.

The Supreme

Court of Cdlifornia reversed the action of the trial judge and
said the action should not have been dismissed because of the
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defendant's conduct notwithstanding the mandatory provisions of
§583.

Section 583 of the California Code of Civil Procedure

reads similar to §73-3-15, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.

Section

583 states in part as follows:
_An~ action heretofore or hereafter commenced shall
be dismissed by the court in which the same shall have
been corrnnenced or to which it may be transferred on
m?tion of the defendant, after due notice to the plaintiff or by the court upon its own motion lID.less such
action ~s ~rought t? tria~ within five (S) years after
the ~laintiff ~as filed his actions, except where the
parties have filed a stipulation in writing that the
time may be extended . . ..

The California Supreme Court held that the purpose of §583
is to prevent avoidable delay in bringing an action to trial and
recognizes that a delay of five (5) years as declared by the
statute is unreasonable as a matter of law and is sufficient time
to complete preliminary matters in bringing the cause to trial.
However the court recognized that the statute is not designed
To arbitrarily close the proceedings at all events in
five (5) years. It expressly permits the parties to
extend the period without limitation by written stipulation. Exceptions have been recognized by the courts.
One arises where a party is unable, from causes beyond
his control, to bring to the case to trial either
because of the total lack of jurisdiction in the strict
sense on the part of the trial court or because proceeding to trial would be both impracticable and futile.
Whether it is impossible, impracticable, or futile to
proceed to trial must be determined in the light of the
circumstances in each case. The circumstances include
not only the terms of a written stipulation but the
acts and conduct of the parties and the proceedings
themselves.
[emphasis added]
Similarly, in Tresway Aero Inc. v. Superior Court of Los
Angeles Co., 96 Cal.Rptr. 571, 487 P.2d 1211 (1971), the California Supreme Court was asked to entertain a mandamus proceeding
to compel the Los Angeles County Superior Court to quash service
c

summons and to dismiss the action for failure to serve sunnnons

1,·ithin three (3) years after the filing of the COMPLAINT.

The

Supreme Court held that where a corporate defendant received a
copy of a COMPLAINT and a defective sunnnons and shortly thereafter requested and obtained a twenty (20) day extension of time
in which to make appearance, and the defendant's manuvering
getting additional time to plead resulted in plaintiff's failure
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to serve proper SUI!Ill1ons within the three (3) year period allowed
from the filing of the COMPLAINT, the ends of substantial justice
require that the defendant be estopped from moving to dismiss.
The pertinent provisions of §58la of the California Code of Civil
Procedure read as follows:
No action heretofore or hereafter co=enced shall
be further prosecuted, and no further proceedings shall
be had thereon, and all actions heretofore or hereafter
cornnenced must be dismissed by the court in which the
same shall.have been COI!llllenced, on its own motion, or
on the motion of any party interested therein whether
named in the complaint as a party or not, . . '. unless
the summons shall be served and a return thereon made
within three (3) years after the commencement of said
action, except where the parties file a stipulation in
writing that the time may be extended.
The California Supreme Court held that "notwithstanding the
mandatory language of §58la, the trial court is vested with
discretion in applying exceptions comparable to the discretion
with which it is vested in apply exceptions to §583," of the Code
of Civil Procedure requiring dismissal of actions not brought to
trial within five (5) years after being filed.

The court further

held that as with the exercise of the court's other inherent and
statutory powers to dismiss actions for want of diligence in
either serving the summons or bringing the action to trial, the
discretion pemitted must be "exercised in accordance with the
spirit of the law and with the view of subserving, rather than
defeating, the ends of substantial justice."

The court recog-

nized that each case must be decided on its own particular facts,
and no fixed rule can be prescribed to guide the court in its
exercise of this discretionary power under all circumstances.
In Tresway Aero Inc., supra, the court discussed the implied
exception of impracticability and the doctrine of estoppel as
related to §§58la and 583 of the California Code of Civil Procedure.

The court stated these doctrines affirm that "a person

may not lull another into a false sense of security by conduct
causing the latter to forbear to do some things which he otherwLe wo;1lcl hzive done and then take advantage of the inaction
c;iused by his own conduct."

Similarly, in the instant case where
-26-
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the defendant's own conduct lulled the plaintiffs into the false
sense of security that the action would not be dismissed, and
where the plaintiffs have substantially invested time and money
into the purchase of the real property and water rights and have
further incurred legal fees and other court costs, the defendant
should be estopped to raise the dismissal provisions of §73-3-15.
If the defendant's MOTION TO DISMISS is granted, the plaintiffs
will have purchased nine hundred and sixty (960) acres of ground
that will be virtually worthless because there will be no water
rights in connection therewith.
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VI.

THE UTAH CASE OF DANSIE v. LAl1BERT IS NOT CONTOLLING IN THE
INSTANT CASE BECAUSE DANSIE DID NOT RAISE THE CONSTITUTIONAL
OBJECTIONS TO §73-3-15 NOR THE WAIVER AND ESTOPPEL ISSUES AND
BECAUSE DANSIE WAS DECIDED SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF INDISPENSIBLE
PARTIES AND NECESSARY JOINDER OF PARTIES.

The only case cited by the defendant in support of its
MOTION TO DISMISS is Dansie v. Lambert, 542 P.2d 742 (Utah 1975).
The defendant basis its entire case upon the hope the trial judge
will find Dansie is identical to the issues raised in the instant
case.

However, it is to be noted none of the arg1.llllents raised

in this MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES were raised in the
Dansie case.

The only issues decided in the Dansie case were

issues dealing with indispensible parties and necessary joinder
of parties.

In Dansie, the plaintiff argued that since the State

Engineer had not joined in the other defendants' MOTIONS TO
DISMISS under §73-3-15, the State Engineer was not entitled to
the benefit of the dismissal.

In noting this limited scope of

the issue to be decided on appeal, the Supreme Court stated in
part as follows:
Plaintiff attacks the authority of the trial court
to dismiss the complaint with prejudice against the
defendant engineer, who did not join in the motion to
dismiss, but plaintiff does not attack the ~uthor~ty as
to the other co-defendants in which event, if plaintiff's request for relief were granted, there would
remain a case lacking indispensible parties.
Thus, the court is quick to point out that the plaintiff was not
attacking the authority of the other co-defendants to raise the
motion to dismiss.

Conversely, however, the plaintiffs in the

instant case are attacking the right of the State Engineer to
raise the MOTION TO DISMISS and are attacking the provisions of
§73-3-15 as being unconstitutional and void.

The plaintiffs also

allege the defendant-State Engineer cannot raise the limitation
provisiuns in this statute because he has waived them or is
estopped to raise them.

None of these points were considered by

the Supreme Court in Dansie.
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The court went on to emphasize a second time the narrow
issue raised on appeal by saying:
Plaintif ~ does not claim the statute is or is not
mandatory. ~is sole point on appeal is that the trial
judge erred in granting the motion as to the Engineer.
The fallacy of t~e contention lies in the fact that the
s~at~te has nothing ~o do with joinder of parties,
dismissal as to parties and the like, but simply applies to the life or death of a cause of action.
It therefore appears clear the Utah Supreme Court has never
passed on the issues of "waiver," "estoppel," and the constitutional infirmities in the statute which are raised by the plaintiffs in the instant MEMORANDUM.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiffs respectfully
request the court to deny the DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS on
the grounds that §73-3-15, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended,
is unconstitutional and void and/or on the further grotmds that
the defendant State Engineer has waived his right to raise the
limitations provisions of the said statute and/or is estopped to
raise the said provisions.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
Mcl1URRAY, McINTOSH, BUTLER & NIELSEN

By

.:Ju

J

I

I

DELIVERY CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I personally delivered a true and
correct copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
AND AUTilORITIES IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO DENY DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO

DISMISS to Dallin W. Jensen, Assistant Attorney

General, Attorney for State Engineer, 301 Empire Building,
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2 31 East Fourth South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this 5th day
of December, 1978.
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(

State of Utah

:ss
County of Salt Lake)

Dean

w.

Sheffield, being first duly sworn on oath deposes and says:

1.
That he is the Executive Director of the Utah State Bar, and in
that capacity has the records of the Utah State Bar under his direction and
control, including the record of membership in the Utah State Bar.
2.
J. Lambert Gibson was a member of the Utah State Bar having been
admitted to the Bar January 5, 1937. He was suspended from the Bar June 13,
1967 for non-payment of license fees, and was re-instated April 26, 1968.
Mr. Gibson was again suspended May 14, 1971 for non-payment of license fees
and was not thereafter re-instated,

L~,, ,, -/iv,'.~; ~, /
I ,

Dean w. Sheffield/
Executive Director
Utah State Bar

/l

Sworn and subscribed before me the~ day of October, 1978.

My

.:cJminission

expires~ay of~~ _lgkl.
Notary Public

EXHIBIT 1
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COtlTR.i\CT OF SALE
TH IS AGREEMENT, made and entered into this 6th day of August,
i, by and between John Davis as administrator of the estate of
~ Baldwin a/k/a Jeffery Mathewson Baldwin, deceased, hereinafter

led the SELLER and Morley Wilson and Mary Ellen Wilson, husband
wife, as joint tenants with full rights of survivorship and not
tenants in common, hereinafter called the BUYERS.
W I T N E S S E T H :
1.

For and in consideration of the promises, covenants, and

·eements hereinafter contained, the SELLER agrees to sell and the
'ERS agree to purchase the following described property situated in
; county of Iron, State of Utah, and more particularly described as
Llows, to-wit:
a. E 1/2 of Section 7 and all of Section 9, Township 32 South,
Range 13 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, containing approximatelf 960 acres.
b. Together with the following described personal property:
two commercial gas engines to operate pumps, sprinkler heads
and pipe, 89 lengths of 4" x 40' aluminum hand line galvanized
pipe, water meter, and small culinary pump well.
c. Together with approximately 106 acres underground water rights
and any and all other water rights which are appurtenant to the
960 acres described hereinabove to include, but not necessarily
be limited to applications 24624, 24625, 24626, and 24627 which have
been filed with the Utah State Engineer's office and which are the
subject matter of that certain lawsuit in the District Court for
Iron County, Civil No. 5178 entitled, Jeff Baldwin, Plaintiff, v.
Hubert C. Lambert, State Engineer, Defendant.
d. Together with all rights, privileges and improvements thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining, including an undivided
one-half (1/2) interest in all oil, gas and any and all other
underground rights and interests with the SELLER reserving to
itself one-half (1/2) of said rights with the understanding that
upon the death of the SELLER the entire oil, gas, and/or mineral
rights or interests shall then pass to the BUYER herein.
PURCHASE PRICE:

As purchase price for said land and property,

le B~i[FS agree to pay to the SELLER the sum of Fifty-Six Thousand
ive H,rndred Dollars ($56,500.00)

payable as follows:

Three Thousand

ive Hundred Dollars ($3,500.00) down on the date hereof, the receipt
,f which is hereby acknowledged by the SELLER.

The unpaid balance

't the purchase price in the amount of Fifty-Three Thousand Dollars

$53,000.00)

b2

shall be paid in ten (10)

equal annual installments of
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·i·ve Thousand Three Hundred Dollars ($5 , 300 . 00) eac h p 1 us accrued
.nterest at the rate of five percent (5%)

per annum on the unpaid

)alance of the purchase price, with the first installment not to
ie paid before the 30th day of November, 1978, and thereafter payable
Jn the 30th day of November, each year thereafter until the total
purchase price, plus accrued interest, has been paid in full.

That

interest at the rate of five percent (5%) per annum will commence to
run on the 30th day of November, 1977.
3.

POSSESSION:

The BUYERS shall have the right to possession

and occupancy of said premises from and after the date hereof and so
long as they are not in default under the terms of this agreement.
4.

TAXES:

The taxes levied or assessed against said property

for the year 1976 shall be paid by the SELLER, and the BUYERS shall be
responsible for the payment of all taxes levied or assessed against
the property from and after the year 1976 and during the remaining life
of this agreement.
5.

WATER RIGHTS:

right for forty (40)

It is understood and agreed there is a water

acres of underground right which has not been

proved up on or certified by the State Engineer's office.

The

BUYER is to proceed with all diligence to prove up on said water right,
but should it eventually happen through no fault of the BUYERS that
the State Engineer during the first five (5) years of this agreement
shall reject any part of the water right herein sold, the total purchase price shall be reduced by the amount of Four Hundred Twenty?ive Dollars ($425.00) per acre for that property sold with water and
that proper adjustment shall be made to subsequent payments.
6.

ESCROW:

It is agreed that this agreement and all related

docu:r,,mts are to be escrowed at the American Bank of Commerce, 444
South Main Street, cedar city, Utah, and the following documents
shall be placed with said escrow:
a.

The original of this Contract of Sale.

b.

A warranty deed describing the real and pers~nal property herein sold, together with the water rights and
naming as Grantor both the SELLER herein and any other
heirs, devisees, and/or legatees to whom ~he said property described in this CONTRACT OF SALE is to be distributed in the probate estate of Jeff.Baldwin, deceased;
and naming as Grantees the BUYERS herein.
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c.

An abstract of title brought down to date to be furnished to Robert.L. Gardner, Attorney at Law, for his
examination of title and within a reasonable time thereafter, the abstract shall be placed in the escrow.

It is agreed that all costs and expenses of said escrow shall
be shared equally between the parties hereto.
7.

DEFAULT:

In the event of a failure to comply with the terms

hereof by the BUYERS or upon the failure to make any payment when the
same shall become due and within thirty (30) days after written
notice of said default, the SELLER shall be, at his option, released
from all obligation in law and equity to convey the said property
to the BUYERS, and all payments which have been made theretofore
by said BUYERS shall be forfeited to the SELLER as liquidated damages
for the nonperformance of this agreement, and the BUYERS agree that
the SELLER may, at his option, re-enter and take possession of said
property without legal process as in its first and former estate,
together with all improvements and additions made by said BUYERS
thereon, and the said additions and improvements shall remain with
the land and become the property of the SELLER, and this agreement shall
become null and void and of no further force and effect.
It is agreed that time is of the essence of this agreement and
the remedies given in the preceding paragraph to said SELLER are in
addition to any and all other remedies provided by law.
8.

BINDING EFFECT:

This agreement shall be binding on the heirs,

dcstributees, successors, executors, administrators and personal
representatives of each of the parties hereto.
9.

NOTICE:

Any notice contemplated herein to be served upon eithe:

party hereto shall be in writing and shall be sufficiently given if
mai ;.•
~0

in the United states Post Office, postage prepaid and certified

tie parties at the following addresses:
Ci£LLER:

John Davis
State Bank
Utah 84751

~ilford
~1lford,

Send notice to seller also to:
Patrick !! . Fenton
At torne:; at Law
13 West Hoover Avenue
CedarSponsored
Cit:;,
Utah 8..J 720
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'y

§_~'
Morley Wilson and Mary Ellen Wilson
Box 147
Enterprise, Utah 84725
or such other addresses as the parties may from time to time in writing
designate.

Service of notice by mail shall be deemed effective and

complete upon date of posting and mailing in accordance herewith.
10.

ATTORNEY'S FEES:

Should it become necessary by either party

to this agreement to employ legal counsel to enforce any term or
provision hereof, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover
from the other a reasonable attorney's fee plus costs.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties to this agreement have hereunto
set their hands the day and year above first written.

the
Jeffery

;

~

.

MARY ELLEN WILSON
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